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Many Americans are completely carried away with sports.  During
the last baseball strike in 1994, Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institu-
tion (yes, there really is an economist with that famous baseball name)
tried to put sports into perspective during his testimony before Con-
gress.  He pointed out that while the Major League Baseball (MLB) as
an industry was just under $2 billion a year, the envelope industry
topped the $2 billion mark.  In a slightly broader view, the cardboard
box industry generated well over triple that amount annually.  He pro-
ceeded to lightly scold the subcommittee for spending its scarce and
valuable time on such small potatoes.
Watching this testimony on C-SPAN, I was (very briefly) ashamed.
After all, the importance with which I view sports is neatly summa-
rized in one of my favorite Far Side cartoons.  Artist Gary Larson
shows a group of primordial sea-dwellers just off shore.  One of the
group holds a bat, and their baseball lies on the beach, just out of reach.
The caption reads, “Great Moments in Evolution.”  The clear implica-
tion is that baseball is the reason we waddled out of the ooze in the first
place.  And here before Congress was an economist of no small renown
pointing out that this inflated enthusiasm is over an industry that is
dwarfed by only a small share of the paper products industry.
But my shame faded when I remembered that there is no cardboard
box page in the daily paper.  And it never has been the case that mas-
sive public subsidies for cardboard box companies have been on a ref-
erendum ballot.  Sports really are different than cardboard boxes.
Many of us enjoy benefits from sports that are vastly beyond what we
spend on them.  Whole other media industries thrive on its output, and
it can be a consuming passion, this love of sports shared by so many.  I
think I might mail a copy of that Far Side cartoon to Professor Aaron.
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This depth of feeling generates the concern of so many fans over
the current state of pro sports.  Talk to any sports fan and you will get
at least one of the following opinions.  Rising ticket prices threaten to
slam the door on the average fan.  Growing revenue imbalance leaves
most teams out of contention before the season even starts.  Strato-
spheric player salaries make it impossible to identify with players and
introduces skepticism about whether or not they really lay it on the line
every play.  And do not even get a fan started about labor-management
relations!  MLB fans have recently lost their play-offs and a World
Series because of them, and National Basketball Association (NBA)
fans just lost half a season to labor unrest.
All of these outcomes are for the fans lucky enough to have a team.
Many other fans have spent what seems an eternity waiting for an
expansion team to arrive in their area.  Others have seen their existing
team threaten relocation at the drop of a hat.  Team owners put all-or-
nothing demands on their host cities and balk at every hint of intrusion
into the power they wield over their sport.  No other industry in the
United States has such control over 1) exclusive geographical franchise
rights over the entire industry, 2) team movement and location, 3) gate
and TV revenue sharing, 4) TV contracts as a joint venture, and 5)
entering talent through rookie drafts.
In the midst of all this unrest, you’ll find economists nosing
around.  In our book, Hardball (1999), James Quirk and I organize the
questions surrounding this fan frustration into a few chapters.  Are the
media and big TV money to blame?  Is it player unions?  Owners?
Sports leagues?  State and local politicians?  Or what?  As you can
probably guess, we point our finger at “or what,” which we define as
market power.
Almost all economists see the ultimate culprit as market power,
which derives from the special legal treatment of leagues.  The out-
comes are exclusive franchise rights for teams, management of sports
leagues as cartels, and a complete stifling of any competing leagues,
precisely those indicated by the basic economic theory of market
power.  In what follows, I will run through this logic and suggest what
can be done about these outcomes.
Not much of what I am presenting here is new.  Many of the issues
were raised during the Federal Baseball decision of 1922, MLB’s so-
called antitrust exemption, enjoying its 75th anniversary this year.
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Since that time, nearly all of these issues have been raised repeatedly in
Congressional hearings that date back to 1951 and that represent at
least 49 years of Congressional scrutiny.  The ameliorative device pro-
posed here also is not new.  I found it first voiced in Congressional tes-
timony by Ira Horowitz and Roger Noll in 1976.  The problem is long-
standing and one can only marvel that the current market power struc-
ture of sports leagues has withstood this scrutiny for so many years.
MARKET POWER PROBLEMS IN PRO SPORTS
Before proceeding to the heart of the matter—namely, market
power—let us examine the more well-publicized culprits.  Many claim
that the media and big TV money cause most of the economic prob-
lems in sports.  But the media are nothing more than a pipeline for
advertising revenues, transporting them from advertisers, through
broadcasters, and on to sports leagues and teams.  There can be little
doubt that the game on the field or floor is different because of televi-
sion; there wouldn’t be much point to on-field celebrations or taunting
without an audience.  But to networks, sports are just another type of
programming that reaches particular demographic groups of interest to
their advertisers.  And, given that leagues can confront a small number
of bidders with a chance at the rights to these important properties, it
should come as no surprise that the bulk of the proceeds moves to the
leagues and their teams.  And this happens because leagues are allowed
to act jointly in the sale of their TV rights, a practice that surely would
be outlawed in any other industry.
Sportswriters are especially fond of making unions one of the
major culprits in pro sports.  Unions have no doubt changed the face of
professional sports by removing nearly all of the mechanisms that
owners previously used to restrict the free movement of players
between teams.  The result is that players now receive salaries much
closer to the value of their contribution to team revenues.  Some fans
might begrudge players their huge salaries, but the money that fans
spend on sports will not go away.  If players don’t get the money, then
owners will keep it.  In no small way, salaries are large because leagues
earn more than the normal rate of return; it is the monopoly profit
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earned by leagues that is up for grabs in player–owner negotiations.
Because players are free to move between teams without this profit,
there wouldn’t be much for a union to negotiate except minimum sala-
ries and benefit packages.  In summary, unions have not created the
fabulous wealth available to athletes; they have just been proficient at
moving that wealth from owners to players.
What about the players, themselves?  Is their insatiable greed at
least partly to blame for rising ticket prices?  There is both a contradic-
tion and a fundamental economic misunderstanding behind this view.
First, for the interesting contradiction, why do fans think that players
are any greedier than anybody else, including themselves?  How many
fans would be willing to take less than they could possibly make?  Sec-
ond, for the economic misunderstanding, sports salaries simply reflect
the value that fans place on player talent.  Player salaries are not the
cause of high ticket prices or the rise of pay-per-view televised games.
Instead, it is the willingness of fans to pay ever more for sports that
raises player salaries and encourages owners to seek new avenues of
collection like pay-per-view.  Players are no more to blame for the high
price of sports than movie stars are to blame for the rising price of
movie tickets.  According to economic theory, it is demand that drives
the result.  Besides, if players didn’t take their share, would anybody
reasonably suggest that owners would rebate the balance to fans?
So, it is not the media, or unions, or players who are responsible
for market power problems.  However, the source of the problem
plaguing pro sports comes to light when we examine owners and their
behavior together as a sports league.  At the most basic economic level,
owners possess the rights to a very valuable monopoly.  That monopoly
is granted by pro sports leagues, in plain view for all to see.  Because
leagues are allowed to behave like cartels in controlling inputs and out-
puts, individual teams in these leagues confront no current or future
competition from rivals.  The result for fans in this setting has been
clear since the time of Adam Smith-restricted output, prices greater
than marginal cost, and profits greater than the normal rate of return.
Thus, it is not the personalities of owners that cause the economic
problems in pro sports; it is in fact the leagues, which operate as one of
the most successful monopolies in history.
That leaves politicians.  Typically, when market power runs wild,
we hope for political intervention to protect consumers, but, if any-
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thing, politicians have facilitated sports monopolies.  First, despite the
open invitation by Justice Holmes in his Federal Baseball decision,
Congress has never intervened to define the antitrust status of MLB.
Second, pro sports league mergers have been encouraged by Congress
rather than denied.  Finally, specific laws enacted by Congress, from
local black-out laws to joint venture sale of TV rights, have served to
cement the monopoly power of leagues.  And it doesn’t get any better
at the local level.  Witness the stadium mess plaguing so many current
pro sports team hosts.
So, there you have it.  Ticket prices are high because there are no
competing teams in the same geographic market to push prices to mar-
ginal cost.  Competitive balance is lacking because leagues restrict the
number of teams in large revenue markets to the advantage of all
league members.  Salaries are higher than they would be under compe-
tition because some of the rents from market power accrue to players in
a labor market that is carefully managed by unions.  Strikes and lock-
outs occur as owners and players lock horns over the division of
monopoly profits.  Because leagues carefully manage the number of
teams, output is restricted and prices rise, and some cities are pur-
posely held open to solidify threats of relocation against current host
cities.  On the other hand, host cities are confronted with these all-or-
nothing propositions because the careful management of alternatives
by pro sports leagues has resulted in a lack of substitutes for profes-
sional sports teams.  All this has occurred because market power has
been allowed to dominate in pro sports.
Make no mistake about it.  The value of market power in pro sports
is high.  When an owner buys a team, the price includes rights that are
valuable beyond control of capital and a player roster.  The new owner
buys a monopoly right to provide the only game in a specific location as
a member of the league.  This right yields 1) gate, stadium, and local TV
revenues; 2) any revenues that can be extracted from players; 3) special
tax treatment; 4) a share of league-wide, national TV contract revenues;
5) a share of league earnings from expansion fees; and 6) spill-over ben-
efits to other business enterprises of the team owner.  In Los Angeles, the
value of these rights recently was revealed at around $300 million dur-
ing the sale of the Dodgers in 1998.  In Cleveland, it was $530 million
for the Browns in 1998.  Abroad, it was nearly a $1 billion offer for the
Manchester United soccer team in 1999.
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There isn’t any mystery about the remedy: a stiff dose of competi-
tion.  However, this kind of economic competition is repulsive to own-
ers and league personnel.  National Football  League (NFL)
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue has been quoted as follows (Sports Illus-
trated, September 16, 1996), “Free market economics is the process of
driving enterprises out of business.  Sports league economics is the
process of keeping enterprises in business.”  Quite aside from inventing
a brand new term, sports league economics, the self-serving nature of
the statement is only barely veiled.  Before proceeding to a prescription
for what ails pro sports, let us examine just what we would expect from
a good stiff dose of competition.
ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE SPORTS LEAGUES
As Walter Neale (1964) pointed out long ago, the economics of
sports indeed is peculiar.  Cooperation is essential for the survival of
sports leagues.  They must cooperate in order to determine a schedule
and a common set of rules and their enforcement.  Appeals are essen-
tial, so some sort of cooperative central decisions are necessary.  And,
finally, leagues may need to cooperate to determine championship for-
mats.  But no one expects this cooperation to result in a restriction of
output and prices exceeding marginal cost.  That sort of cooperation is
no more justified in pro sports than it is in any other economic
endeavor.
Economic competition would tip the economic scales away from
owners and players and toward fans and taxpayers.  First, think about
TV.  Competition among leagues would eliminate monopoly profits
from national TV contracts.  Because a monopoly league can maxi-
mize TV revenues by restricting the number of games shown, introduc-
ing competition would result in more televised games.  This would
reduce the value of game broadcasts to advertisers because competition
acts to bid away the profits earned from market power.  Similarly, local
TV revenue would decrease.  Local broadcasters would go with the
cheapest team of equal quality in their area.  And the same argument
applies to gate receipts.  If fans could find substitute teams of equal
quality, they would go with the one that charged least.
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The impact of competition on player salaries is more difficult to
determine.  Players would no longer contribute to an economic activity
that earned more than a normal return; therefore, players would be
worth less.  A further decline in player salaries would be expected from
competition.  Charles Finley, former owner of the Oakland Athletics,
knew this well.  He responded to player demands for free agency in the
mid 1970s with a hoot.  He suggested that MLB embrace this idea
whole-heartedly because competition would kill the rising union tide
and, along with it, salary arbitration and other artificial mechanisms
propping up salaries.  If competition removed sports unions from the
picture, wages would fall even further.  But there would be an impor-
tant, off-setting factor.  If leagues became truly and legally competi-
tive, other restrictions on player earnings would not be expected to
survive.  For example, a rookie draft would wither away with the intro-
duction of competition; this sort of restriction would not stand up to
raiding by rival leagues.  Thus, players in a competitive situation would
be worth less than they had been under monopoly; and if their ability to
organize were dealt a death blow as well, then their salaries might
decrease further.  But, this decline would be partly offset when other
restrictions on earnings withered away under competition.
And while we are on the topic, most labor-management strife
would disappear with competition because the major source of strife,
monopoly profits, would be gone.  Unions might still try raising pay
for some players, which, in a competitive environment, would only
increase owner costs and reduce overall player employment, but this
behavior would be up to the union members themselves.  The union
focus might shift to pensions and other fringe benefits.  And the
already contentious issue of income distribution between superstars
and journeyman players would increase.
Perhaps the most dramatic impacts of competition would occur in
expansion and relocation.  Under competition, all financially viable
locations would have a team from one league or another.  This would
probably increase the number of teams in megalopolis markets and
fans in these locations would enjoy more professional sports; but there
would be a downside for other fans.  Because gate and TV revenues
would be lower, current marginal locations might become unprofitable.
As always, with changes in market structure, there would be distribu-
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tional consequences.  Here, the trade-off would appear to be between
the fans of marginal teams in a few cities and fans in larger areas.
State and local taxpayers also would feel the impact of competition
on expansion and relocation.  Because all viable locations would have
a team, team owners would not be able to make threats about leaving
their current host cities.  In fact, the tables would take a dramatic turn:
teams actually would compete for financially viable locations.  If one
team pushed its host too far, another team would be waiting in the
wings for a lower subsidy.  Competition should reduce subsidies to
teams and possibly even put a market rental rate on existing and future
publicly owned stadiums.
So, in a competitive economic environment, there would be more
teams in big cities and a team in all economically viable locations.  Cit-
ies would provide much lower subsidies, if any, in the form of extrava-
gant stadiums and sweetheart stadium deals.  The stadium mess would
be alleviated.  There would be more games on television, lower reve-
nue to teams from television contracts, and lower ticket prices.  Player
salaries could either fall or rise, depending on the relative impacts of a
few obvious labor market factors.  Team profits would fall and fran-
chise values along with them.  In effect, power would be shifted from
players and owners to fans and taxpayers.  Some fans would enjoy
more sports, while others would lose their team if it was just hanging
on in the first place.
But economic competition has its limits, which must be considered
when prescribing a remedy to the problem of market power in pro
sports.  First, there have been competitive leagues in the past, but the
tendency has always been back toward a single, monopoly league.
Economic competition has not been self-sustaining in pro sports, his-
torically.  Owners in rival leagues would ultimately see the value in re-
forming another monopoly; therefore, something more than just setting
the wheels of competition in motion would be required to create
change.
Another nuance to pro sports leagues also dictates caution in the
prescription for market power.  Existing leagues have already estab-
lished their reputations and created a strong sense of fan identification.
These teams suffered low or negative profits during their early years of
growth and have paid public relations expenditures since that time.
The returns on such an investment are the monopoly profits earned by
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these sports teams under their current league structures, and these
returns have been earned for quite some time.  A rival league planning
to compete with existing leagues would have to make the same kind of
investment, in addition to competing for talent to demonstrate that they
really were an enduring, big-league alternative.  This effort would be
required in order to encourage fans and the media to commit their loy-
alties to their new league.  But, if competition were enforced from the
very outset for the new rival, the league would not be able to recover
these costs.  So, competition would not sustain itself, and it must be
sustained externally in a very careful manner in order to nurture a rival.
In addition to the economic circumstances described so far, politics
also impede economic competition in pro sports.  As even the most
casual student of government and the sports business knows, choices
by elected officials often facilitate, rather than ameliorate, market
power.  Congress has failed to respond to the MLB antitrust court deci-
sion of 1922.  In 1962, it exempted league-wide TV contracts in all
sports from antitrust laws.  Congress exempted the American Football
League (AFL)–NFL merger from antitrust laws in 1966 and brought
pressure to bear on the NBA to merge with the American Basketball
Association (ABA) in the mid 1970s.  Congress also has allowed other
leagues to exercise veto power over the location of their teams.  Now,
leagues put teams where they want them and carefully control the most
lucrative markets. Thus, despite repeated investigation, Congressional
action has consistently enhanced monopoly power in sports, and state
and local government outcomes have given us the stadium mess con-
fronting so many current and prospective host cities.
CREATING ECONOMICALLY COMPETITIVE 
SPORTS LEAGUES
In summary, competition stands a better than decent chance of
eliminating the ills in pro sports.  But competition will not be self-sus-
taining, and in sustaining competition, one must exercise caution.
Generating fan loyalty and staying power would be an expensive prop-
osition for any new, competing league.  Some long-term return would
be required to make such an investment pay.  An assurance of return
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would mean that special antitrust accommodations would be required
because overzealous enforcement of competition would kill that return
and the hope for competitive leagues.  Finally, there is no reason to
expect that federal, state, or local politicians would embrace a more
economically competitive setting for pro sports.  Politicians pursue
reelection.  Currently, that pursuit appears to favor the current market
power status of leagues and we should not expect any change until
politically potent opposition appears.  A few voices crying in the wil-
derness is not enough.
For all but its political limitations, one plan would work.  Suppose
an existing league were simply broken up into competing leagues.  The
foundation is there already.  The American and National leagues in
baseball would be economically competitive if they were not under
unified, cartel management by MLB.  Indeed, prior to 1901, the two
were, by and large, economic competitors!  Essentially the same thing
is true of the NFL.  The American Football Conference (AFC) and the
National Football Conference (NFC), with only a few cross-over
teams, are precisely the most recent version of the AFL and the earlier
NFL prior to the merger in 1969.  The same would be true of the NBA
and the National Hockey League (NHL).  A breakup could restore
much of the same competition that existed prior to their mergers with
the ABA and the World Hockey Association (WHA), respectively.
Therefore, a breakup of existing leagues could potentially create com-
peting leagues.
But, again, one would not expect this situation to last on its own.
Enforcement of these breakups under existing antitrust laws would be
required for competition to flourish.  If leagues tried to regroup and
merge, antitrust enforcement should preclude their forming new car-
tels.  Perhaps the most important element of a breakup/antitrust
enforcement approach is that it would allow the resulting, competing
leagues to retain the fan loyalty and media ties that they had cultivated
over the years.  The new leagues already are “major” in every sense of
the word.  And they wouldn’t lose the fan identification that they have
cultivated over the years.  Interestingly though, one would expect that
expenditures aimed at maintaining this loyalty would fall over time.
The reason?  The return on such investments would be falling under a
competitive structure.
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Of course, any movement away from monopoly would affect the
welfare of leagues, players, fans, and taxpayers.  Owners and players
could be characterized as losers because their welfare will fall.  Over-
all, fans would be winners because they would enjoy sports at lower
prices, and taxpayers would win because subsidies would be reduced.
However, some fans at locations with marginal teams might lose
because competition would drive marginal teams out of business or to
other locations.
One of the usual questions posed at this point is “What would be
the quality of competition on the field with increased economic compe-
tition?”  A long-standing “invariance principle,” attributable to Simon
Rottenberg (1956), suggests that quality will stay at its current level.
After all, all of the earnings over and above the competitive rate were
pure economic rents.  Because the changes projected here would occur
league-wide, players and coaches would face diminished opportunities
wherever they turned in their sport.  And their nonsport alternative
would not have gotten any better.  Would players play for less and
coaches coach for less, rather than leave their sport?  Almost certainly.
Although the level of competition, while probably still unbalanced
across a given league, would not be expected to decline.
Perhaps the minor leagues (baseball, basketball, and hockey) and
college football, which operate at the same time and often in the same
vicinity as major league teams, might prove instructive on the quality
issue.  Because economic competition would yield a different number
and mix of teams of major league caliber, with more of them located in
the largest cities, perhaps there would be a more continuous quality
gradient between the current minor leagues and college conferences
and the major leagues.  Among the minor leagues and college teams,
size and drawing power are similar to the determinants that would
drive a competitive pro league structure.
But the nagging question is just how in the world will this ever
happen.  This idea of breaking up the major leagues dates back to Con-
gressional testimony in 1976 by Ira Horowitz and Roger Noll, and still
there has been no political action.  This inaction is cause for pessimism
among those interested in fixing the problems of market power con-
fronting sports fans.  However, market power and its consequences in
pro sports must be good for politicians because it has been the norm for
almost 100 years. 
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The environmental movement offers instructive lessons in chang-
ing the political status quo.  When a problem becomes important
enough to voters, they become politically mobilized.  It is an expensive
and laborious process.  Those bent on such change must successfully
accomplish an overwhelming educational mission.  They must also
overcome the high costs and free-riding behavior associated with orga-
nizing a politically potent group.  After all of that, they face the dog-
eat-dog world of advocate politics.  Small wonder that market power
has ruled in pro sports given the obstacles to bringing it down.
But maybe the times are changing.  On the Internet, many fan
advocate and alternative ownership arrangement pages have begun to
appear; and the Internet dramatically reduces the costs of forming
organizations.  Further, while Major League Baseball appears to be
rebounding from the strike of 1994, it could well be an illusory return
driven mostly by the “Mark and Sammy Home Run Show.”  Dramatic
revenue dispersion remains a source of tension between owners, and
any additional interruption of play could bring down the wrath of fans.
This wrath, however, might be a prerequisite to forming a politically
potent interest group aimed at eliminating the market power in pro
sports.  Perhaps this organization might begin with the NBA, which is
in turmoil.  Their fans just lost half a season and are getting a weak
imitation of the usual level of NBA play.  If NBA fan interest groups
rise to change the current local reelection margin, they may remedy the
problem.  For that is surely the only real solution.  I hope I have made it
clear that the culprit is market power.  The rest is up to the fans, who,
after all, are the source of nearly all of the profit in the first place.
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